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Network formation within the BRITE-EURAM program is investigated. We de-
scribe the role of the hub of the network, which is deﬁned as the set of main con-
tractors that account for most of the participations. We study the effects that the
conﬂict of objectives within European research funding between pre–competitive
research vs. European cohesion has on the formation of networks and on the rela-
tionship between different partners of the network.
Apaneldataset isconstructedincludingthesecond andthirdframeworkofthe
Brite–Euram program. A model of joint production of research results is used to
test for changes in the behavior of partners within the two frameworks.
The main ﬁndings are that participations are very concentrated, that is a small
groupofinstitutionsaccount formost oftheparticipations,but goingfromthesec-
ond to the third framework the presence of subcontractors and single participants
increases substantially. This result is reinforced by the fact that main contractors
receive smaller spill-inswithin networks, but spill-ins increase from the second to
the third framework.
JEL Subject Classiﬁcation: Positive Analysis of Policy–Making and Imple-
mentation (D78), National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Gen-
eral (H50), O32 (Management of Technological Innovation and R& D) and O38
(Governent Policy).1 Introduction
The European Commission (EC) has been pursuingan activepolicy of fundingre-
searchsinceitsinception. TheECR&Dprojectsintendtohavestrategiccharacter,
i.e. they are aimed at changing the objectives and methodsof research, rather than
simplyaugmenting thesearch fornewknowledge. On theonehand theEChas the
objectiveofimprovingthecompetitivityoftheEuropean industrybytheinvention
and development of new processes and products, and on the other hand it wants to
trigger projects that would not be initiated without this funding. Another goal is
to promotelinks between academic and industrialresearch. These objectives have
to be balanced out with the goal of European cohesion, trying to expand research
capabilities to institutions from underdeveloped regions.
This wide and diverse set of objectives is not always internally coherent. Es-
pecially conﬂicting are the attempts to foster pre-competitive research and being
at the same time market oriented, as it is often the case for industry–oriented R &
D research programs. In some of these programs the funding effort is supposed to
contribute to the process of European cohesion, but at the same time the projects
must be selected on technical and scientiﬁc merit alone. Another typical conﬂict
arises from the fact that picking a mix of institutions with different research ca-
pabilities contributes to the diffusion of new techniques and results and therefore
improvestheresearchcapabilitiesoftheEuropeanscientiﬁccommunitytakenasa
whole, while funding the most reputed institutions allows the programs to present
a high research productivity in the short run.
These conﬂicts can be studied by means of a simple framework. The funding
agency, in this case the EC, demands scientiﬁc results and supplies funds for re-
search, while the research units demand funds and supply results. We do not have
information about scientiﬁc results, but we have very detailed information on the
fundingeffortbytheEuropeanCommissionandabouttheparticipationofresearch
units in the Brite–Euram program.
In this paper we study the effects of the funding effort by the European Com-
mission on both the supply and the demand of funds, and on the participation of
research units in the networks formed. We study the contracts signed under the
Brite Euram program for the second and third framework. Particular attention is
given to thehub of thenetwork, that ismain contractorsor originatorsof networks
that span different networks and different years, accounting for a substantial pro-
portion of the total participation in networks. We use a model of coalition forma-
tionand spill–inswithinthecoalition (seeOlson and Zeckhauser, 1966, orSandler
andMurdoch,1990)to formulatean empiricalmodelandanalyzetheeffectsofEC
fundingon thenetworks, by assessing howtheroleof thehub and theevolution of
1the networks have changed along the two frameworks.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present a theoretical model
of network interaction. We proceed in section 3 by describing themain featuresof
the Brite/Euram program. This allows us to identify some dynamic featuresof the
contracts signed, which we present in section 4. The theoretical model is ﬁnally
implemented empirically and tested in section 5. We conclude in section 6.
2 A model of research coalitions
Westartbyproposingamodelofnetworkinteraction,based onsimilarmodelsthat
have been proposed in the literature for the production of joint public goods 1.
Weconsiderthenetworksascoalitionsofresearcherswhichengageinresearch
activitiesthatprovidebothprivateknowledgeoutput,whichisinstitution–speciﬁc,
and public knowledge output, which is network–speciﬁc.
Letqi betheprivateknowledgeandki thepublicknowledgeproducedbymem-
ber i of a network, and li the general research activities provided by the i–th com-
ponent of the network. The joint production relationships for qi and ki are given
by:
q
i D fi.li/; (1)
and
k
i D gi.li/; (2)
where both fi./ and gi./ are assumed to be twice continously differentiable and
concave.
Consider the total publicknowledgeproducedwithin the network, K.S i n c eK
is a purely public good within the network, each partner receives the knowledge
that he/she produces, ki, and the commonknowledgespilled in fromtherest of the
network, Q Ki D
P
j6Di ki. Hence, each partner receives:
K D Q K
i C k
i:
If the network has n members, the knowledge that spills over to participant i
1For a survey of this kind of models see Sandler (1992), chapters 4 and 5. The version that we
present here follows closely Sandler and Murdoch (1990).
2derives from the aggregate activities Q Li of the n−1 partners according to the fol-
lowing relation:
Q Ki D s.Q Li/; s0 > 0; s00 < 0: (3)
We model the choice of network activity by the utility function of a represen-








where xi represents the nummeraire, or the choice of other goods (income effects
are assumed to be negligible).











There are two ways of obtaining demand functions from this model: 1) the
Nash–Cournot equilibrium concept implies that each agent chooses the level of
activity in order to maximize his or her utility subject to an income budget con-
straint and to theprevailing contributionsof public knowledgefrom the rest of the
network, Q Li D
P
j6Di l j and 2) the Lindahl equilibrium concept, that assumes that
network members communicate and exchange information concerning the level
of the public knowledge that they are going to share in the network, but meet the
costs by individualized cost shares (the shares must sum to one, so that costs are
covered).
Themaximizationproblemforthei-thagentinthecaseofNash–Cournotequi-











where px and p are the prices of x and L respectively, and Ii C pQ Li is income.
Thesolutiontothismaximizationproblemisthedemandfunctionfortotalnet-






i; py; p; Q l
i/: (5)
where the subscript N stands for Nash-Cournot. The network demand for com-
mon knowledge depends on prices, income and the level of knowledge spill-ins.
3In equilibrium all members of the network will demand the equilibrium level of
total network research activity, that is le D li
N for all i.
For a research coalition, we can also take into account that the search for sci-
entiﬁc results can be considered a race against other research teams, and therefore
theresearch expenditureof other similar networkscan beconsidered as a “threat”,
T, for any given coalition of researchers. If we condition all the analysis to this




N.Ii C pli; py; p; Q li;T/: (6)
In the case of Lindahl equilibrium concept, each partner in the network is as-







K D Q K
i C k
i (8)
and the joint production relationships are
q
i D fi.L/ (9)
and
K D g.L/: (10)
In this case the total level of the collective research activity, k, produces both
theprivateand publicknowledgeexperienced by each partnerof thenetwork. The
Lindahl equilibrium concepts implies a cooperative game, and therefore the part-
ners choose the equilibriumlevel of joint research. Each partner contributesa pri-
vate effort to the relationship and is assigned a share in the aggregate cost of the
project, i.




















where H stands for Lindahl.
Wewillbaseourestimableequationsonequation(6)fortheNash-Cournotcase
and equation (11) for the Lindahl case. We will assume that the total research ac-
tivityassumed by each networkcan bemeasured by theEC contribution,whilethe
total income that each participant has, is given by the total cost committed to the
project. We do not have information about knowledge prices, but assuming that
prices of the rest of goods and knowledge prices move together, and taking into
account the 0-degree homogeneity of the demand functions, we can formulate the
demand functions only in terms of income and spill-ins, by deﬂating all variables
by a common price deﬂator.
Wewillusethismodeltoinvestigatethedemand functionsforECcontribution
of different types of participants at different moments in time. It is necessary ﬁrst
to describe what are the relevant types of participants, and how participation has
evolved over Framework 2 and 3 of the Brite–Euram program.
3 The BRITE - EURAM shared-cost projects
The following analysis focuses on the contracts signed in the period 1989–1993
in the BRITE-EURAM I and BRITE-EURAM II (henceforth in general BE) pro-
grams 2. BE represents a particularly suitable program for our purpose for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, its technological and sectorial foci represents a heteroge-
neous set of participants (Commission, 1992b: p.41; Commission, 1993: p.10).
Second,the sectorial orientationinvolvesnotonly applied and development work,
but also more basic research with industrial applicability. Third, if we consider
both thenumberof participationsand thefundinglevel for shared cost actions, BE
is the second most important program throughout this period.
We obtained the original data set from the DGXII of the EC. The contracts
signedwererespectively352, with1783participations3, intheSecondFramework
(SF) and 703, with 2056 participations, in the Third Framework (TF). For each
2The contracts signed under RAW and AERONAUTICS are not included.
3In this part of the article for participation we mean a contractor of any category, including
alsoinstitutionsinvolvedintime/contributionamendments. Inthestatistics,instead,participations
come only from contractors involved in shared–cost actions.
5Table 1: Participations in the two frameworks, break down by type of cost
Cost Type 2nd. Framework 3rd. Framework Total
ECO 1,302 (73.2%) 1,221 (73.5%) 2,523 (73.3%)
MAR 476 (26.8%) 441 (26.5%) 916 (26.7%)
Total 1,778 1,662 3,440
Source: Elaboration EC Data
contract we were providedwith the followinginformation: title of the project, du-
rationof thecontract,cost and EC contribution4, participantsnamesandlocations,
and participants position in the network (main contractor, secondary contractor,
subcontractor, etc.). Instead, we did not succeed in obtaining information on the
organizations: type of institution (large enterprise, small-medium enterprise, uni-
versity, research organization, etc.) and its dimension. As we were interested in
the research network, we decided to focus our analysis only on shared-cost col-
laborative research projects. Therefore, we excluded from our database the fol-
lowing types of contracts: feasibility award, ﬁrst step CRAFT, concerted action,
other ’like-grant’ action, and time ammendments. Instead, we considered the in-
stitutionsinvolvedincontributionammendmentsasnormalcontractorstakingpart
in thenetwork. Thedatabase constructed in this way takes then into account about
90% of the contracts (of those involving shared-cost actions) signed during the
Second FrameworkProgram,and 80% of theones signed duringthe Third Frame-
work Program5.
As shown in Table 1 and 2 we have a population of 3,440 participationssubdi-
vided in 673 contracts, with 350 contractsin the SF and 323 in theTF. The type of
cost, MAR or ECO, identiﬁes the participants that receive up to 100% of the ad-
ditional cost (MAR, limited to High Education Institutions, HEIs), and the other
participants type, to whom the Community reimburses up to 50% of the project
costs (ECO).
When we look at the total population, HEIs with a bit more then one fourth of
theparticipations,areplayingaquiterelevantrolebothintheSFandintheTF.But,
whenwelookatmaincontractorﬁguresnotonlytheirrelevanceislessevident,but
also their share is going down from the SF to the TF. Therefore, if we make the
4The community reimburses up to 50 % of the project costs to companies or institutes that
operate a project costing system. Universities, higher education establishments and similar non–
commercial bodies receive up to 100 % of the additional costs.
5The Third Framework will last up to the end of 1994, then the 80 % represents an estimate of
the contracts signed up to March 1st, 1994.
6Table 2: Main contractors participations, break down by type of cost
Cost Type 2nd. Framework 3rd. Framework Total
ECO 278 (79.4%) 263 (81.4%) 541 (80.4%)
MAR 72 (20.6%) 60 (18.6%) 132 (19.6%)
Total 350 323 673
Source: Elaboration EC Data
Table 3: EC contribution in the two frameworks, break down by type of cost (in
Million ECUs)
Cost Type 2nd. Framework 3rd. Framework Total
ECO 275 (73%) 293 (77%) 568 (74%)
MAR 101 (27%) 88 (23%) 189 (26%)
Total 377 380 757
Source: Elaboration EC Data
assumption that projects directed by a HEI are more focused on pre-competitive
research, we can highlight a strong and increasing market orientation for the pro-
gram. To reinforcethisobservationinTable3 weshowthedataconcerningtheEC
contribution. WhileintheSFtheshareofEC contributiontoHEIsand theshareof
their participations are about the same value, in the TF they are different due to a
decrease in the EC contribution of about 4 points6. Therefore, in the TF, HEIs not
only have played a less important role in establishing the research efforts, with a
subordinateposition as the main contractor, but they have also received less funds
from the EC, thus weakening furthermoretheir impact.
To understand the differences between BE I and BE II we develop a more de-
tailed analysis of the EC contribution. Firstly, we subdivide the variable EC con-
tribution in six categories:
(1) 0 - 25,000 ECU;
(2) 25,000 - 100,000 ECU;
6Comparing these ﬁgures with the ones of the total framework (see for example Commission,
1994b)wenotethattheBEprogramsarecharacterized bya lowerlevelofHEIparticipations,anda
higherlevelof HEI funding. Therefore, compared tothe aggregate ﬁgure, HEIs in theBE program














(3) 100,000 - 200,000 ECU;
(4) 200,000 - 300,000 ECU;
(5) 300,000 - 500,000 ECU;
(6) > 500,000 ECU.
We classify the contracts (in this case one for each participation) in relation to
these classes. In Figure 1 we show the allocation of EC Total contribution.
Each bar represents the number of contracts present in that class. The distri-
bution is very similar in the two frameworks. The TF, as expected, has slightly
lower values than the SF. Only in the ﬁrst and in the last category it has a higher
number of contracts. In particular, the increase of the ﬁrst class is mainly due to
the relevant raise in the number of HEIs contracts.















the ﬁrst category is more than double, the ﬁfth has lost about 30% of the partici-
pations.
On the other hand, (see Figure 3), enterprises and research centers have de-
creased their participation in low budget contract (class 2 has lost a relevant num-
ber of contracts) and they have increased their presence in the top class.
Therefore, the increase in the total number of participations with a contract of
the sixth category is only caused by this last dynamic feature. Therefore, we can
again reconﬁrm and deﬁnitely support the previous observation that HEIs have
played a decreasingly important role in the context of the BE programs.
As we highlighted previously, the share of participations and the quota of EC
contributions have about the same value in the SF and slightly different in the TF.
Althoughthisdifferenceisimportantfortheunderstanding ofapeculiartrend, itis
not crucial for the general analysis. Therefore, given the prior description, in our













10Table 4: Distribution of the participation type
Participation Type 2nd Framework 3rd Framework Total
100 350 – 19.7% 323 – 19.4% 673 – 19.5%
200 337 – 19.9% 312 – 18.8% 649 – 18.9%
300 305 – 17. 1% 296 – 17.8% 601 – 17.5%
400 258 – 15.5% 196 – 11.8% 454 – 13.2%
500 178 – 10.0% 1 3 5–8 . 1 % 3 1 3–9 . 1 %
Other Contractors 1 3 0–7 . 3 % 1 4 2–8 . 5 % 2 7 2–7 . 9%
Sub Contractors 220 – 12.4% 258 – 15.6% 478 – 813.9%
TOTAL 1778 – 100% 1662 – 100% 3440 – 100%
Source: Elaboration EC data
4 Network formation and the hard hub
Up to now we have regarded participants as anonymous institutions without soul
and we have ignored completely the network dimension. In this section we try
to ﬁnd a remedy to this shortcoming. Afterwards, we focus our analysis on the
formation of networks.
In Table 4 we show the participations distribution according to the position in
the network (100 = main contractor, 200 = second contractor, etc). We can high-
light two changes in the networks from the SF to the TF.
First, there has been an important increase in the number of subcontractors7.
Networkshave become morebranched in small components. Therefore, the num-
ber of network linkages with different priority level has increased. At the two ex-
tremes are the relationship among contractors at the international level on the one
hand, and the linkage between contractors and subcontractors at the local level on
the other hand, which was pre-existing to the RTD projects. The increase in sub-
contractorsimpliesanincreasedprobabilityofhavingnetworkscomposedbyparts
of already pre-existing networks. Therefore, networks of the TF are characterized
by less genuine novelty.
Second, up to the third contractor thereare no big differences between the two
frameworks. Instead, the share of participants identiﬁed as fourth contractor has
strongly decreased in the TF. Hence, in the last framework the networks are com-
7Each contractoris entitledtosub–contractpart of his/herresearch to otherinstitutionsthat be-
come his speciﬁc subcontractors
11Table 5: Network by number of partners
Number of Partnersa 2nd Framework 3rd Framework Total
1 7 – 2.0% 3–0 . 9 % 10 – 1.5%
2 22 – 6.3% 7–2 . 2 % 29 – 4.3%
3 44 – 12.6% 91 – 28.2% 135 – 20.1%
4 58 – 16.6% 52 – 16.1% 110 – 16.3%
5 94 – 26.9% 54 – 16.7% 148 – 22.0%
6 61 – 17.4% 42 – 13% 103 – 15.3%
> 6 64 – 18.3% 74 – 22.9% 138 – 20.5%
TOTAL 350 – 100% 323 – 100% 673 – 100%
Source: Elaboration EC data.
aThe number of partners is given by the sum of coordinators, contractors, sub–contractors and
contributionammendments contractors.
posed by a smaller number of contractors. Typically in the TF there are three con-
tractors and a certain number of subcontractors. In general, the TF’s networks are
then characterized by a lower number of contractors and a larger number of sub-
contractors.
Whenwetakeintoaccounttheaveragenetworksdimension,thedistinctionbe-
tween contractorsand subcontractorsbecomesless important. In Table5 weshow
the networks’ distribution by dimension (number of partners) in the two frame-
works. While the mean number of partners is about ﬁve for both frameworks, in
the TF slightly less than 50% of the projects are carried out by networks with four
or less participants. This is due to the fact that an extremely high number of net-
works(91) have only threeparticipants. On the other hand, in theSF the networks
with ﬁve participants are the ones with the highest share. Then, going from the
second to the third framework we can highlight a contraction in the dimension of
the network, with a polarization of projects within the three–participants network
structure.
In general, without taking into account the participants’ position in the net-
work,themostrecentFrameworkProgramischaracterizedbynetworksofasmaller
dimension. Moreover, when we look also at the type of participants, the networks
of the TF are not only smaller but they are also characterized by a larger amount
of subcontractorsthan by an increasing numberof, probably pre-existing,one–to–
onerelations. Therefore,it seemsthat thiskind ofevolutioncan hindertheprocess
12Table 6: Concentration in the participation
2nd Framework 3rd Framework Total
Single Participation 711 71.2 % 780 75.3 % 1184 69.6 %
(A) (40 % ) (47 %) 34.4 %
Repeated Participation 287 28.8 % 256 24.7 % 516 30.4 %
(B)
Total Number
of Institutions 998 1,036 1,700
(C) = (A) + (B)
Expanded 1,067 882 2,256
Participations (60 %) (53 %) (65.6 %)
(D)
Total Participations 1,778 1,662 3,440
(E) = (A) + (D)
Source: Elaboration EC Data.
ofdiffusionofnewtechnologies(andofrelatedknowledgebasesand capabilities),
that is at the base of the European science and technology policy. On the other
hand the shrinking of the network dimension can be also due to organizational in-
efﬁciencies connected to the management of a large dimension network. So it can
beconsidered as a needed cost –i.e. less institutionsinvolved means less diffusion
of new knowledge– to obtain the generation of new technologies –i.e. less part-
ners means easier management and then higher probability of succeeding in the
research.
To study the effectiveness of the EC diffusion policy we decided to analyze
the concentration in the participation. We assigned a name (A, B, C, etc.) to the
variousparticipatinginstitutionsandwe identiﬁedthem inthe differentprojectsin
bothframeworks. The resultisshown in Table6. An institutioncan beinvolvedin
RTD projectsonly onetime (singleparticipation),or moretimes (repeatedpartici-
pation). Forthelattertypeoforganizationitisthenpossibletocalculatehowmany
times, included the ﬁrst, it has taken part into a project (expanded participations).
The analysis of these variables enables us to compare the two frameworks and to
draw some conclusions on the real impact of the EC funding in terms of diffusion
policy.
First, the average number of participations for the institutions with repeated
13participation (D/B) is decreasing. From 3.72 participation in the SF to 3.45 in the
TF. In other wordsthe institutionswith onlyone participationobtainedin the TF a
higher share of contracts (from 40% to 47%). Second, when we consider the two
frameworks together we can highlight a higher value for the average number of
participations(4.37). This is due to the presence of institutionsthat are both in the
SF and in the TF. Third, there are 334 institutions present at least one time in both
frameworks. This group of institutions is characterized by an average number of
participationsequal to 5.41. Moreover, these 334 institutions, after theﬁrst partic-
ipation, are involved another 1474 times in a project. Considering that in the two
frameworks together there are 1740 participations that are repetitions, it follows
that the 334 institutions are responsible of 85% of the repetitions (1474 = 0.85 
1740). They represent only 19.6% of the population, but they account for 1808
contracts, that is to say 52.6% of the total contracts signed during the two frame-
works. Fourth, The 516 institutions with repeated participation in the two frame-
works together can be divided in two groups. The ﬁrst group is formed by the 334
institutionswithameanparticipationof5.41andthesecondgroupisformedbythe
182 institutions with an average number of participations equal to 1.46 (266/182,
where 266 = 1740 - 1474). Finally, the 1700 institutions present in both frame-
works can be characterized as follows:
 The ”singles”, formed by 1184 institutions that got only one contract;
 The ”networkers”, formed by 182 institutions that got more contracts, but
only in one framework;
 The ”hard hub”, constituted by 334 institutions that got more contracts in
both frameworks.
To conclude, we can highlight an effort of the Commission for enlarging the
population of institutions involved in RTD projects. In the TF there is, indeed, a
larger variety. There are more institutions with a single participation. Therefore
we can consider the increase in the number of single participants as a positive in-
dicator of the impact of the EC diffusion policy. However, it is extremely impor-
tant to stress the relevance of the hard hub. If 19% of the institutions succeed in
getting 52% of the contracts it means that more than a half of the EC funds are di-
rected to the same group of institutions. Assuming that these organizations have
anextremelyhighquality,thenexcludingeverykindofbureaucraticinertiaandall
types of possible industrial lobbying, this implies that the distribution of funds is
heavily shaped by the merit criterium and then strongly inﬂuenced by cumulative
and self reinforcement mechanisms 8. Therefore, considering both BE programs
8Institutions that are succesful in getting funds for their research have a higher probability of
14together, the type of involvement enables us to highlight that the Commission is
putting a stronger emphasis on the short-term, high performance objectives leav-
ing a secondary role to diffusion policy.
Itseemsthatparticipantsincludedinthehardhub,networkersandsingles, may
have signiﬁcant different behavior within the networks. We will try to provideev-
idence on this differential behavior by estimating the theoretical model presented
above.
5 Empirical results
In this section we estimate the demand functions derived in section 2.
Asadeﬂatorweuseareal effectiveexchangerateindexagainsttheECU,since
all values are given in this currency unit. As the threat variable, T,w eu s et h e
average EC contribution for networks of the same size in the same framework.
Weassumealoglinearrelationforthedemandfunctionsderivedintheprevious
section. Total income for each partner of a network is not available, and therefore
we have to adopt the assumption that preferences are strongly separable and that
the budget constraint depends on the the total budget assigned to the project. As
the dependent variable we use total EC contribution.
Equation (6) for the Nash-Cournot case is then formulated as:
logCONTRIBUTION D i0 Ci1 logINCOMEC (12)
i2 logSPILLCi3 logTHREAT C
N
i
where CONTRIBUTION is the total contribution of the EEC to the network,
SPILL is the total contribution to the network minus the contribution for individ-
ual i, THREAT is the average EC contribution to networks of equal size and IN-
COME is total income approximated by the total cost of the project plus SPILL.
We add a random perturbation term N
t .
Equation (11) for the case of Lindahl equilibrium is formulated as:




producing exploitable research which improves their probability of joining other projects in the
future (see David, 1993, Dasgupta and David, 1994 and Geuna, 1995).
15whereCOSTisthetotalcost oftheproject,SHAREistheindividualcost share
(individualcontribution received over total contribution),THREAT is the average
contribution to networks of similar size and L
i is a random perturbation term.
In equation (12) the variables INCOME and SPILL are simultaneously deter-
mined in the theoretical model with the EC contribution, and therefore they are
correlated with the error term. Similarly in equation (13) the variable SHARE is
correlated with the error term. Consistent estimates can be obtained by applying
an instrumental–variableestimation procedure. As instruments we chose the total
cost of the project (COST) and the threat variable (THREAT).
In table 7 we show the results. The ﬁrst column presents the pooled regres-
sion over both frameworks and types, while the rest of the columns lists separate
regressions for both frameworks and types of participants. We show ﬁrst the re-
sults both for the Nash and Lindahl model, and afterwards we will conduct a test
to discriminate among these two models.
For the Nash-Cournot equilibrium models, the estimated elasticities are pos-
itive and signiﬁcant in all the cases. This provides support for the joint–product
model. Both activities, public common knowledge and private appropriation of
knowledge, show elasticities which are less than unity showing that these are nor-
mal goods.
For the case of the Nash–Cournot equilibrium the estimated elasticities show
an increase in the spill–in effects from the second to the third framework. This
result is consistent with the dynamic features described in section 4. The spill–in
effectsseem alsolessimportantforthehubandthenetworkers,whichisconsistent
with theirroleas network spanners. Singleparticipants, on theother hand, receive
the highest proportion of spill-ins within the networks.
In the case of the Lindahl speciﬁcation, the negative coefﬁcient of theSHARE
variable is consistent with the Slutzky equation for the case of a Lindahl equilib-
rium. There is also a signiﬁcant increase in the absolute value of this coefﬁcient
from the second to the third framework for the hub and the networkers, and a de-
creaseforthesingles. ThisisconsistentwiththeresultsobtainedfortheNashequi-
librium.
It is interestingtodiscriminatebetweenthese twomodels, whichprovidesevi-
dence on the cooperative behavior within the networks. We conduct a non–nested
J-test for discriminating between the models9 The methodology consists of two
new regressions, which are constructed as follows: First a regression is run on the
Lindahl model, and then the predicted values of this regression is added as a new
explanatory variable to the Nash model. If the estimated coefﬁcient for this new
9See MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) on the methodology of this test.
16Table 7: Nash-Cournot and Lindahl coalition models. Dependent Variable: total
contribution of the EU
Pooleda Second Framework Third Framework
Regression Hard Hub Networkers Singles Hard Hub Networkers Singles
Nash equilibrium
Intercept 0.003b 0.77 1.23b 0.56b 0.76 0.50b -0.07b
(0.12) (0.30) (0.71) (0.30) (0.20) (0.39) (0.37)
Income 0.59 0.61 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Spill 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.41 0.32
(0.02) (0.04) (0.18) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Threat 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.10 0.08 -0.04b 0.09b
(0.02) (0.04) (0.16) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
Lindahl equilibrium
Intercept -0.15b 1.06b 2.14b 1.07b 1.11 -0.35b -1.34
(0.22) (0.67) (1.35) (0.81) (0.40) (0.76) (0.59)
Cost 0.45 0.45 0.31 0.55 1.45 0.53 0.44
(0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.07)
Share -0.41 -0.40 -0.27 -0.52 -0.44 -0.59 -0.40
(0.03) (0.05) (0.13) (0.08) (0.05) (0.16) (0.10)
Threat 0.54 0.46 0.53 0.34 0.45 0.46 0.63
(0.03) (0.06) (0.16) (0.11) (0.06) (0.17) (0.12)
All the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at a 5 % level unless otherwise noted.
aAll the data for both frameworks and type of participants pooled.
bNot signiﬁcantly different from zero at a 5 % level.
17Table 8: J-Test for discriminating between Nash and Lindahl behavior
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
L t-ratio Conclusion N t-ratio Conclusion
Second Framework
Hard Hub -0.49 -2.3 Reject 1.60 53.0 Reject
Networkers -0.95 -1.7 Fail to reject 1.77 18.1 Reject
Singles -0.69 -3.3 Reject 1.39 27.4 Reject
Third Framework
Hard Hub -0.05 -0.3 Fail to reject 1.15 38.6 Reject
Networkers 0.42 0.6 Fail to reject 0.94 10.6 Reject
Singles 0.04 0.2 Fail to reject 1.23 39.1 Reject
variable, which we call L, turns out to be signiﬁcantly different from zero, then
the Lindahl model is supported (Hypothesis 1). If it is not signiﬁcantly different
from zero then there is evidence against the Lindahl model. The second regres-
sion consists of this procedure reversed, that is, a regression is run with the orig-
inal Lindahl model plus the predicted values of the Nash model, obtaining a new
coefﬁcient N (Hypothesis 2). We conduct this test for the 6 models, that is for
the twoframeworksand the three types of participants. The results are reportedin
table 8.
Our data seem to support a non–cooperative behavior in the interaction of net-
workers, especially in the third framework. For that framework the Nash model
cannot be rejected while the Lindahl model is rejected in all instances.
186 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the dynamics of network formation within the
Brite-Euram program. This is a program implemented by the European Union to
fosterindustry–universityR&Dresearchwiththeobjectiveofimprovingthecom-
petitiveness of European industry.
We unveiled some dynamic features for the role of the hub of the networks,
main contractors, and the behavior of followers. We found that a small group of
institutionsaccount for most of theparticipationswithin thenetworks, but that go-
ing from the second to the third framework of projects, the presence of subcon-
tractors and single participants increases. Therefore the most reputed institutions
are receiving most of the funding, but at the same time an increasing number of
participants are receiving spill–ins from the hub.
This interpretationis reinforcedbya testable model of coalitionformationand
spill-ins of public knowledge within the coalitions. We model networks as coali-
tions formed with the objective of jointly producing private knowledge and com-
mon knowledge which is public within the networks. In this kind of model, we
ﬁnd that institutions that account for most participations receive smaller spill-ins
than institutions that participate many times but only in one framework or institu-
tionsthat participateonlyonce. Spill–insalso seem toincrease from the second to
the third framework.
These results may have important policy implications related to the long–term
results pursued by EU funding, and the short–term results of increasing competi-
tivenessforEuropeanindustries. Thecohesionobjectivesinprinciplehindershort–
term results, but through an indirect way by powering the hub of the networks, in-
creased spill–ins are being generated to a larger number of institutions.
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20Appendix: The BRITE–EURAM family of research
programs
The ﬁrst BRITE-EURAM program was built on the experience and the achieve-
mentsemerging from theseparate BRITE (Basic Research in IndustrialTechnolo-
gies for Europe) and EURAM (European Research on Advanced Materials) pro-
grams. In particular, under BRITE (1985-1988) 215 shared-cost research projects
were developed. The European Commission (henceforth EC) allocated 180 mil-
lion ECUs (MECU) to that program. The most relevant aim of the program was
to develop the applications of new technologies and new materials in traditional
industrial sectors. During the same span of time under the EURAM (1986-1989)
programtheEC approved91projects, forabout 30MECU. The programhad as its
maingoal to stimulatethedevelopmentof research innewmaterials(CEC, 1992a:
p.65).
The BRITE-EURAM I (1989-1992)program (henceforth BE I) is then the ag-
gregation and extension of these two programs. It was approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers on March, 1989. It was budgeted under the Second Framework
Program for about 500 MECU. The main aim of this 4-year program was to im-
prove the competitiveness of European manufacturing industry in the world mar-
ket. Moreover, the following strategic objectives were also indicated: (i) to fos-
ter trans-frontier collaboration in strategic industrial research, (ii) to support the
transfer of technology across Community frontiers and between sectors, particu-
larly those with many small and medium enterprises (SME), (iii) to underpin the
process of European cohesion (Commission, 1993: pp.9-16). Even if the program
was devoted to pre-competitive research it was characterized, more than the pre-
vious two, by market-oriented activity. The Program covered 5 R &D areas:
(1) Advanced Materials Technology,
(2) Design Methodology and Assurance,
(3) Application of Manufacturing Technologies,
(4) Technologies for Manufacturing Processes,
(5) Aeronautics.
To assist SMEs, the program included not only shared-cost research contracts,
but also concerted actions and feasibility awards 10. Emphasis on SMEs and mar-
ket orientation of research distinguished the BE I program from the previous two.
10ConcertedActionsareprojectstosupportthecoordinationofbroad–based, pan–Europeancol-
21On September, 1991, within the Third Framework Program,the Industrial and
Material Technology program (BRITE-EURAM II) was approved for the period
1991-1994 by theCouncil of Ministers. The operating budget of the programwas
approximately670MECU.Thisprogramresultedfromthemergingofthetwopro-
grams BE I and Raw Materials and Recycling (1990-1992) 11. Following the pre-
vious program, the basis of BRITE-EURAM II (henceforth BE II) was the revi-
talization of European manufacturing industry. Its main aims were: (i) to increase
the competitiveness of European industry in the face of strong international chal-
lenges, particularly in strategic sectors of advanced technology; (ii) to strengthen
European economic and social cohesion consistent with the pursuit of scientiﬁc
and technical excellence; (iii) to increase implementation of advanced technolo-
gies by SMEs; (iv) to increase involvement of manufacturing SMEs in European
RTD thereby developing links with other enterprises (Commission, 1992b, pp.7-
11).
The program was characterized by a focus on advanced technology, the rele-
vance given to the process of European economic and social cohesion and by the
particularsupportfortheSMEs’participation 12. Theprogramincludedthreemain
technical areas –i.e. areas of research– which were:
(1) Materials & Raw Materials:
(1.A) Raw Materials and Recycling,
(1.B) New and Improved Materials and Their Processing;
(2) Design & Manufacturing:
(2.A) Design,
(2.B) Manufacturing and Engineering;
(3) Aeronautics.
laborativeresearch activitiesinpromisingnew technologieswiththebeneﬁt of real added valueas
a result of cross–border collaboration. The Commission supports the coordination costs, but not
the research cost. FeasibilityAward is a special type ofcontract, available toSMEs, that covers up
to 75 % of the costs of research undertaken within nine months (subject to a maximum of 30,000
ECUs) toestablishthefeasibilityofa concept, process or material foracollaborativeBrite–Euram
project.
11During the two years of life of the RAW program 69 shared–cost research projects for about
23 MECU were carried out.
12TheCooperativeResearchActionforTechnology(CRAFT)isdesignedtoprovideenterprises,
especially SMEs not having their own research facilities, with the possibility to contract outside
research institutes to carry out research on their behalf (ibid: p.13).
22Industrial enterprises, universities, research centers and other institutions have
taken part into the program through ﬁve different schemes of support. They are:
(1) shared-cost collaborative research projects. In particular, about 90% of the




operative Research Actions for Technology; and (5) Targeted Research Actions,
which imply that for speciﬁc subjects of common interest –e.g. environmentally
friendlytechnologiesandﬂexibleandcleanmanufacturing–industrialresearchprojects
may be grouped together and be subject to special coordination to ensure synergy
between the separate projects. What is interesting to grasp from the previous de-
scription is the continuity between the two BRITE-EURAM programs. Indeed,
BE II can be seen as a further step in the process of deﬁnition of a European pro-
gram. Due also to the Maastricht Treaty and to the feed-back from the previous
program, BE II turned out to be a program with a clearer strategic orientation and
an improved and enlarged variety of schemes of support.
Thenewresearchandtechnologicaldevelopmentprogramintheﬁeldofindus-
trial and materials technologies BRITE-EURAM III (1994-1998) (henceforth BE
III) was approved by the Council of Ministers on July 1994. The operating bud-
get of the program is about 1,700 MECU. The concern with the competitive posi-
tion of the European manufacturing industry is still at the hearth of the program.
In particular, competitiveness is seen as the most effective means of maintaining
and even increasing employment. Due to the latest economicrecession (1990–93)
and due to the increased concern about pollution level, the program aims to stim-
ulate industry’s capacity to ”develop technology for human-centered production
system taking account of human factors and based on clean technologies” (Com-
mission, 1994a: p.7). Three speciﬁc objectivesareidentiﬁed. They are: (i)“in the
short term, priority should be assigned to research for the adaptation of existing
technologies,or forthedevelopmentof newtechnologies... particularlyinsectors
where the level of technology is lower; SMEs in these sectors account for a large
proportion of European industry”; (ii) “in the medium term, research will focus
on industries which are already developing innovative technologies and strategies
allowing better use of human resources while endeavoring to reduce the adverse
environmentalimpactofproduction”;(iii)“inthelongterm,researchwillfocuson
new technologies for the production and the design of products which allow new
industries or markets to be created in a context of sustainable growth” (ibid: p.8).
Theprogramwillincludethreemain technical areas–i.e. areas ofresearch– which
are:
(1) Production technologies for future industries;
23(2) Technologies for product innovation;
(3) Technologies for transport means.
While the ﬁrst two, with different name and different sub-classes, are similar
to the ﬁrst two areas of BE II,the thirdone has been broadened to include not only
aeronautics, but also other technologies for transportation. The program will be
implemented through the same schemes of support used in BE II. The only new
tool is the Pre-Normative Research Project. It is linked to the fulﬁllment of the
generalgoaloftheFourthFrameworkProgramofsupportingtheotherCommunity
policies through pre-normativeresearch. Finally, the observation we made for the
evolutionof BE IIin comparisonwith BE I,can bealso madeforthe newprogram
versus the previous one. What we want to underline here is the existence of an
evolutionprocesswhichcanbelinkedtothechangeofexternaleconomicandnon-
economic factors. However, the various modiﬁcations are not modifying a group
of consolidated features of what we can call the BRITE-EURAM family.
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